Changes in Demand for Food Assistance at New York City Emergency Food Programs After September 11, 2001

Final Report

Prepared By
Food Bank For New York City, Food For Survival
Research and Policy Department

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About the Food Bank For New York City

The mission of the Food Bank For New York City is to end hunger by organizing food, information and support for community survival and dignity.

The Food Bank For New York City, a member of America's Second Harvest and the only food bank in New York City, was founded in 1983 to coordinate the procurement and distribution of food donations from manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and government agencies to organizations providing free food to the hungry. Today, the Food Bank is one of the nation's largest food banks and one of the largest distributors of free fresh produce in the country, providing the food for an average of over 200,000 meals served to needy New Yorkers each day.

To meet the rise in demand for food assistance in 2002, the Food Bank For New York City distributed over 61 million pounds of food to more than 1,000 nonprofit community food programs – including soup kitchens, food pantries, shelters, low-income day care centers, Kids Cafes, and senior, youth and rehabilitation centers – throughout the five boroughs of New York City.

Using on-staff research expertise, the Food Bank For New York City regularly conducts research projects of food programs to ascertain trends and details regarding the degree of hunger throughout the city, socio-demographic profiles of programs and clients, changes in demand for food assistance and needs assessments.

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Summary of Findings

This report presents the findings of a survey of New York City emergency food programs about changes in emergency food assistance demand after September 11. This research study was conducted by the Food Bank For New York City (Food Bank). A total of 643 out of 914 emergency food programs completed surveys, a response rate of 70%. Of the total 278 soup kitchens, 187 (67%) completed a survey. Of the total 636 food pantries, 456 (72%) responded to the survey. Noteworthy citywide and borough analysis findings are summarized below. Complete borough analysis findings are presented in each findings section.

- 80% of soup kitchens and 84% of food pantries in New York City reported increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.
- Among all boroughs, Brooklyn had the highest percentage (90%) of soup kitchens indicating an increased demand for emergency food after September 11 and Queens had the highest percentage (85%) of food pantries.
- Increased demand at soup kitchens peaked eight months after September 11 with 69.1% of soup kitchens indicating a medium or high level of increased demand.
- Increased demand was especially high in Brooklyn and Manhattan where 76.3% and 75.6% of soup kitchens reported medium or high levels of increased demand eight months after September 11.
- The increased demand at food pantries intensified four months after September 11 when 77.7% of programs reported a medium to high increase in demand for emergency food assistance. This percentage dropped slightly to 77.3% eight months after September 11.
- Staten Island had the highest percentage of food pantries reporting a sustained increase in demand for emergency food assistance eight months after September 11 (83.3%), followed closely by Manhattan (80.1%) the Bronx (78.6%), Queens (76.6%) and Brooklyn (74.8%).
- Soup kitchens reported that unemployment (87.5%), homelessness (77.8%) and inadequate wages (60.3%) had the largest impact on the demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.

- Food pantries indicated that unemployment (88.1%) and insufficient wages (73%) were the two factors that had the most notable impact on demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.

- 14.5% of soup kitchens and 19.7% of food pantries stated they were more likely after September 11 to have to turn away clients seeking emergency food assistance, most commonly as a result of a lack of food or operating funds.

- A considerable percentage of soup kitchens increased the amount of food provided to program clients (41.7%) and increased operating hours (27.3%), and continued to do so eight months after September 11.

- After September 11, over half of pantries increased the amount of food distributed in pantry bags (53.7%), while other pantries had to decrease the amount in each bag (15.1%). Food pantries often found it necessary to increase the number of hours and days they were open (38.2% and 17.5%, respectively). In many cases, changes in operating procedures were still in effect eight months after September 11.

- When asked to rank order program needs with “1” equal to the lowest need and “8” equal to the highest, soup kitchens reported a need for operating funds and food (mean rank= 6.68 and 6.18, respectively) , as well as paid staff and volunteers (mean rank= 4.73 and 4.32, respectively).

- Food pantries indicated a need for funding and food (mean rank= 6.36 and 6.39, respectively) as well as paid staff, volunteers and increased space (mean rank= 4.38, 4.37 and 4.33, respectively).

- 70.6% of soup kitchens and 65.1% of food pantries indicated they are faith-based or otherwise affiliated with a religious organization.

- The most frequently mentioned social services provided by soup kitchens were public benefits counseling and substance abuse counseling (26.2% and 26.7%, respectively).

- The most common social services offered by food pantries are public benefits counseling (37.3%) and substance abuse counseling (25.9%).

- Three out of 10 (30.7%) food pantries serve a homebound population.

- Four out of 10 (40.8%) pantries indicated serving an elderly population, with 26.5% providing home delivery.

- Slightly less than 30% (27.5) of food pantries indicated they serve a population with HIV/AIDS, with 5.3% providing home delivery.

- 15% of soup kitchens reported serving a homebound population, with 13.9% stating they provide prepared home meals and 4.3% indicating they provide packaged food.

- Just below 30% (29.9%) of soup kitchens stated they provide food to an elderly population, half of which (15%) delivered food.

- Nearly one-fourth (24.1%) of soup kitchens reported serving an HIV/AIDS population, with 2.1% indicating home delivery.

- Soup kitchens provide food an average of 2.3 days and food pantries operate an average of 2.2 days.

- Soup kitchens reported an average of 2.8 paid staff and 12 volunteers while food pantries indicated an average of 1.8 paid staff and 10 volunteers.

- 40% of soup kitchens and 41% of food pantries have computers on site, while 27.6% and 25.6% respectively have internet access.

Introduction

In the time period since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 there has been much discussion about the reverberating impact on the people of New York City, especially those citizens who had difficulties securing food, housing, and other basic human needs before September 11.

As a provider of food, information and support to emergency feeding programs (EFPs)[1] in New York City, the Food Bank For New York City realized that hunger was on the rise even before the weakened economy and the high unemployment rates, but that the devastating events of September 11 most likely affected the demand for emergency food assistance at many of New York City's EFPs. In order to determine and document any changes in demand after September 11, the Food Bank embarked on a comprehensive survey of New York City soup kitchens and food pantries.

Previous attempts have been made to measure demand for emergency food assistance in communities. The United States Conference of Mayors released a report in 2001 that synthesized comments from EFPs in 27 U.S cities regarding the demand for emergency food as well as the capacity of EFPs to meet this demand[i]. A key finding was that 33% of cities had to turn away clients seeking emergency food in 2001. In partnership with America's Second Harvest, the Food Bank For New York City surveyed EFPs and their clients in 2001, with one of the objectives being to identify trends in demand for emergency food assistance at New York City EFPs[ii]. Survey findings included 59.6% of soup kitchens and 77.6% of food pantries

[1] Emergency Feeding Programs were defined as soup kitchens or food pantries operating in one of the five New York City boroughs.

indicated an increase in the number of clients utilizing their emergency food services since 1998. A further finding was that 54% of the household members receiving food from the Food Bank were either children or the elderly. Immediately after September 11, 2001 the Food Bank surveyed 185 New York City EFPs in order to document the demand for emergency food assistance after September 11. A key finding of that study was that 81% of EFPs reported an increase in demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.

Research Objectives

There were several objectives that guided this research study. They included:

1. Document changes in demand for emergency food assistance after September 11
2. Describe changes in demand for emergency food assistance at New York City's EFPs immediately after September 11 until eight months after September 11
3. Identify which factors contributed to changes in demand levels for emergency food assistance at EFPs after September 11
4. Document whether EFPs were more likely to turn away program clients seeking emergency food assistance after September 11
5. Identify changes in EFP operations after September 11
6. Identify specific EFP needs after September 11

Methodology

Survey Instrument

A survey instrument was developed containing questions related to demand for emergency food assistance before and after September 11, factors contributing to this increased demand, changes in operations after September 11, socio-demographic profiles of EFPs and their clients, and agency needs since September 11. This survey instrument was piloted with agency directors of ten EFPs in New York City and subsequent revisions were made after input was received.

Response Rate

The survey universe was defined as agencies in the Food Bank network that operated soup kitchens or food pantries. There were two stages involved in gathering data from EFPs. First, surveys were administered to agencies at borough-wide meetings occurring in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Manhattan during May 2002. Second, the survey was mailed to agencies with soup kitchens or food pantries that had not yet completed surveys. After this first mailing, agencies still not responding were sent a reminder letter and another survey instrument, and were contacted by phone. As a result of the borough-wide meeting and two mailings, a total of 508 out of 718 agencies with emergency feeding programs completed surveys, an agency response rate of 71%. These 718 agencies operated a total of 914 emergency feeding programs[2] . A total of 643 out of 914 EFPs completed the survey, for a response rate of 70%. Of the possible 278 soup kitchens, 187

completed the survey, for a response rate of 67%. Out of a total of 636 food pantries, 456 responded to the survey, for a response rate of 72%.

Findings

Findings from the comprehensive survey of emergency food programs in New York City are presented in the following 11 sections. Findings are presented by EFP type (soup kitchen or food pantry) for all of New York City as well as individual boroughs. Where appropriate, agency level data are presented.

Sections 1 and 2 present a profile of responding EFPs and their clients. Sections 3 and 4 contain data that describe changes in demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 as well as the duration and intensity of increased demand. Sections 5 and 6 report on factors impacting the demand for emergency food assistance at EFPs after September 11. Sections 7 presents data on the likelihood of EFPs turning away clients seeking emergency food assistance after September 11. Sections 8 and 9 document changes in EFP operations after September 11 and Sections 10 and 11 discuss the needs of EFPs.

[2] Several agencies operated both types of programs

Section 1. Profile of New York City Emergency Food Programs

This section contains descriptive data from all responding EFPs. Table 1 presents a profile of EFP at the program level and for selected variables at the agency level. Table 2 contains the percentage of EFPs that served homebound and special needs populations.

Table 1: Summary Profile of Emergency Feeding Programs

	All Agencies (N=508)	Soup Kitchen (N=187)	Food Pantry (N=456)
Bronx	22.8%	19.3%	22.8%
Brooklyn	34.3%	35.3%	34.9%
Manhattan	22.8%	27.8%	21.5%
Queens	16.2%	12.3%	17.1%
Staten Island	3.9%	5.3%	3.7%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Average number of days program serves food	--	2.3	2.2
Faith-based	65.9%	70.6%	65.1%
Offer job training	--	16.0%	15.6%
Offer job placement	--	15.5%	16.0%
Offer housing assistance	--	16.0%	20.4%
Offer public benefits counseling	--	26.2%	37.3%
Offer mental health counseling	--	16.6%	22.1%
Offer substance abuse counseling	--	26.7%	25.9%
Offer immigration assistance	--	15.5%	21.9%
Offer daycare	--	4.8%	9.0%
Average number of paid staff	--	2.8	1.8
Average number of unpaid volunteers	--	12.0	10.0
Computer on site	--	40.0%	41.0%
Computer and internet access on site	--	27.6%	25.6%
Fax machine on site	--	69.0%	67.1%

Profile of Soup Kitchens

Slightly over 29% (N=187) of EFPs were soup kitchens. As seen in Table 1 above, 19.3% of soup kitchens were located in the Bronx, 35.3% were located in Brooklyn, 27.8% were in Manhattan, 12.3% were in the borough of Queens and 5.3% were on Staten Island. Soup kitchens were open an average of 2.3 days a week and utilized an average staff size of 2.8 paid staff and 12 unpaid volunteers. Nearly 71%

of soup kitchens reported their programs were faith-based or connected to a religious organization. The most frequently offered social services at soup kitchens were substance abuse counseling and public benefits counseling. Four out of 10 soup kitchens had a computer on site, although only 27.6% had a computer with internet access. Approximately two-thirds of soup kitchens had functional fax machines.

As seen in Table 2 below, of the 187 soup kitchens, 29.9% served an elderly population and 24.1% served populations with HIV/AIDs. Homebound emergency food assistance was offered by 15% of soup kitchens, mostly to an elderly population. Homebound meals in the form of prepared meals were offered by 13.9% of soup kitchens and 4.3% indicated they provide packaged food to the homebound.

Profile of Food Pantries

Food pantries comprised 71% (N=456) of responding EFPs. As presented in Table 1 above, the majority (34.9%) was located in Brooklyn, 22.8% were in the Bronx, 21.5% were situated in Manhattan, 17.1% were located in Queens and 3.7% were on Staten Island. Food pantries indicated an average of 1.8 paid staff members and 10 unpaid volunteers. Food pantries provided food an average of 1.8 days per week. Faith-based food pantries comprised 65.1% of all pantries. Public benefits and substance abuse counseling were the two most commonly mentioned social services at food pantries, followed by mental health counseling, immigration assistance and housing assistance. Forty-one percent of food pantries had a computer and one-fourth had a computer with internet access. Slightly over 67% of food pantries indicated a working fax machine.

Four out of 10 (40.8%) food pantries served an elderly population and 27.5% provided emergency food assistance to an HIV/AIDs population. Slightly over 30.7% provided meals to a homebound population, 26.5% to the homebound elderly and 5.3% to homebound persons with HIV/AIDs. Packaged food items were delivered to the homebound by 29.2% of food pantries, with only 3.5% delivering prepared meals. A small percentage (1.8%) of food pantries with homebound services received funding from Citymeals-on-Wheels.

Table 2: Prevalence of Emergency Food Assistance to Special Needs and Homebound Populations by Emergency Feeding Program Respondents

	Soup Kitchen (N=187)	Food Pantry (N=456)
Serve homebound	15.0%	30.7%
Serve seniors	29.9%	40.8%
Serve HIV/AIDS population	24.1%	27.5%
Deliver prepared meals to homebound	13.9%	3.5%
Deliver packaged food to homebound	4.3%	29.2%
Deliver meals to homebound seniors	15.0%	26.5%
Deliver meals to homebound HIV/AIDs	2.1%	5.3%
Receive funding from Citymeals-on-Wheels	0.0%	1.8%

Section 2. Socio-Demographic Profile of NYC Emergency Food Program Clients Before and After September 11, 2001

This section contains the best estimate by EFPs about the gender, race and ethnicity, and age of clients seeking emergency food assistance in the eight months before and after September 11. Data in Tables 3 and 4 below represent actual program users, and in the case of food pantries, does not purport to capture the socio-demographic information for other family members benefiting from food pantry bags.

Table 3: Agency Socio-Demographic Profile of NYC Soup Kitchen Clients Pre and Post September 11, 2001 (N=187)

Characteristic	Pre 9/11	Post 9/11
Gender		
Male	61.4%	61.7%
Female	38.6%	38.3%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%
Age		
17 and less	9.9%	10.2%
18 to 44	35.0%	33.5%
45 to 64	36.1%	37.4%
65 plus	19.0%	18.9%
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
Race and Ethnicity		
Black/Non-Hispanic	55.6%	54.4%
White/Non-Hispanic	10.0%	11.2%
Asian/Non-Hispanic	2.7%	3.1%
Hispanic	28.4%	28.4%
Other	3.3%	2.9%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%

As shown in Table 3 above, males comprised approximately 61.4% of soup kitchen clients in the eight month period before September 11, a percentage that did not change much in the eight months following September 11. Approximately 71% of soup kitchen users fell into the age categories of 45 to 64 and 18 to 44 before as well as after September 11. Soup kitchens indicated that children comprised approximately 10% and the elderly made up approximately 19% of clients pre and

post September 11. African American soup kitchen clients accounted for 55.6% of all clients in the eight months before September 11, a percentage that dropped slightly to 54.4% in the eight months after September 11. Pre September 11, white non-Hispanics made up 10% of all clients, a percentage that rose slightly to 11.2% after September 11. Post September 11, soup kitchens indicated that Asian Americans accounted for a slightly higher percentage of their clients.

Table 4: Agency Socio-Demographic Profile of NYC Food Pantry Clients Pre and Post September 11, 2001 (N=456)

Characteristic	Pre 9/11	Post 9/11
Gender		
Male	36.9%	39.0%
Female	63.1%	61.0%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%
Age		
17 and less	17.6%	16.9%
18 to 44	30.5%	30.1%
45 to 64	30.7%	31.3%
65 plus	21.2%	21.7%
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
Race and Ethnicity		
Black/Non-Hispanic	46.6%	45.7%
White/Non-Hispanic	12.3%	12.6%
Asian/Non-Hispanic	3.3%	4.1%
Hispanic	34.4%	34.2%
Other	3.4%	3.4%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%

As shown in Table 4 above, food pantries reported that females comprised 63.1% of all persons picking up pantry bags in the eight months prior to September 11, a percentage that dropped 2.1 percentage points in the eight months after September 11. Pre and post September 11, approximately 30% of food pantry clients were 18 to 44 years old, and 31% were 45-64. Children made up 17.6% of all pantry clients before September 11, and 16.9% after. Elderly food pantry clients accounted for approximately 21% of all clients pre and post September 11. Hispanic persons accounted for approximately 34% of food pantry clients before and after

September 11. The percentage of food pantry clients who were African American dropped slightly after September 11, from 46.6% to 45.7%. Food pantries reported that pre and post September 11, 12% of clients were white, non-Hispanic individuals.

The insignificant socio-demographic difference in EFP clients pre and post September 11 indicates that EFPs were serving clients with similar socio-demographics before and after September 11. However, this does not imply that EFPs were serving the same number of clients after September 11. It is possible that EFPs were seeing new clients after September 11 with an age, race and gender composition similar to clients before September 11, or perhaps EFPs were seeing the same clients more often. Several quotes from soup kitchen directors support both of these conclusions:

> *"After September 11, we did not have new users, but we saw the same people more often."*
>
> *"The ages and ethnicities have not changed dramatically. What has changed is a new crop of clients. New clients have been coming in record numbers."*
>
> *"The demographics of both groups have similar ratios to pre 9/11/01. The volume of users has changed more than the make up of the clients."*
>
> *"Our new users followed the same demographic profiles as existed before September 11."*

Food pantry operators also described the post September 11 socio-demographic composition of their clients:

> *"The demographic percentages are very similar, yet the numbers of clients have increased."*
>
> *"After 9/11, our users' ages, races and genders remained about the same."*
>
> *"We have maintained the same percentages of the races indicated in the survey. The quantity of people has increased."*

"New users are the same in terms of race, ethnicity and gender. The change is mostly in the numbers."

"There has not been significant change in the demographical make-up of the clients using our service. The numbers have increased greatly."

Section 3. Changes in Demand for Emergency Food Assistance at New York City Emergency Food Programs After September 11

This section presents the percentage of New York City emergency feeding programs reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11, 2001. Findings are presented by emergency feeding program type for all of New York City as well as individual borough.

Citywide Emergency Food Programs

Figure 1
Percent of NYC Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001



- As shown in Figure 1 above, 137 (79.7%) of the 172 New York City soup kitchens and 372 (83.6%) of the 445 New York City food pantries with valid responses to this question indicated an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11, 2001.

Bronx Emergency Food Programs

Figure 2
Percent of Bronx Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001



- As presented in Figure 2 above, 25 (73.5%) of the 34 Bronx soup kitchens and 84% of Bronx food pantries reported an increased demand for emergency food after September 11.

Brooklyn Emergency Food Programs

Figure 3
Percent of Brooklyn Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001



- As shown in Figure 3 above, after September 11, 55 (90.2%) Brooklyn soup kitchens and 131 (84.5%) Brooklyn food pantries experienced an increased demand for emergency food at their programs.

Manhattan Emergency Food Programs

Figure 4
Percent of Manhattan Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001

- As shown in Figure 4 above, 37 (77.1%) soup kitchens and 80 (83.3%) food pantries in Manhattan stated they had an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.

Queens Emergency Food Programs

Figure 5
Percent of Queens Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001



- After September 11, 13 (72.2%) of the 18 Queens soup kitchens and 64 (85.3%) of the 75 Queens food pantries indicated an increased demand for emergency food assistance.

Staten Island Emergency Food Programs

Figure 6
Percent of Staten Island Emergency Food Programs Indicating Increased Demand for Food Assistance after September 11, 2001



- As seen in Figure 6 above, six (66.7%) of the nine Staten Island soup kitchens and 12 (70.6%) of the 17 Staten Island food pantries had an increased demand for emergency food assistance at their programs after September 11, 2001.

Section 4. Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Emergency Food Assistance at New York City Emergency Food Programs After September 11

This section examines the intensity and duration of reported increases in demand for emergency food assistance for the eight month period after September 11, 2001. Analysis results are presented in stacked bar charts with three shaded areas comprised of low, medium and high levels of demand. When added, these shaded areas represent the total percentage of emergency food programs indicating an increased demand for emergency food assistance during four different time periods after September 11. Changes in stacked bar composition are examined for the eight month period after September 11, and conclusions about the duration and intensity of increased demand for emergency food assistance at New York City emergency food programs are presented.

Citywide Emergency Food Programs

Figure 7
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance
Citywide Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=136)



- As shown in Figure 7 above, of the 136 soup kitchens with valid responses to these questions, 67.6% indicated a medium to high increase in demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. The percentage of soup kitchens reporting an increased demand dropped slightly one month after September 11 (66.9%), but increased to its highest post 9/11 level eight months after September

11 (69.1%). Several soup kitchen operators quantified the varying levels of intensity and duration in increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11:

"We have had many more clients. The increase is about 200 or more a month."

"Since September 11, we have kept a log of new users. As of last Friday, we had approximately 410 new users."

"Immediately after September 11, there was an increase in the number who came to the soup kitchen but right now it has remained as before September 11."

"We had approximately 400 new users since 9/11. We had to prepare more food, longer hours, use more disposable supplies, and use the Director's and Assistant Director's money to purchase supplies and bread."

"9/11 only had impact on our service during September and October. Thereafter our numbers went back to normal, 16,000 to 18,000 per month."

"Since September 11th my client population for the soup kitchen increased 30% because of it."

Figure 8
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance
Citywide Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=371)



- As seen in Figure 8, 67.1% of citywide food pantries reported a medium or high increase in demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11.

- Data indicate that while the percentage of food pantries reporting a medium or high increased demand has increased slightly eight months after September 11 (77.3%), the percentage of food pantries describing the intensity of this demand as "high" increased steadily from 36.4% immediately after September 11 to 51.2% eight months after September 11.

- These results indicate that the increased demand for emergency food assistance has continued to intensify at food pantries well after the events of September 11. Several food pantry operators specifically mentioned the level of increased demand after September 11:

> *"The number of families given emergency food assistance before 9/11 were approximately 75 (once a week) and after 9/11 it increased to 250 plus."*
>
> *"Our food program has doubled in size since 9/11. It has grown from 150 families weekly to 400 families."*
>
> *"We have seen an increase in the number of people coming from approximately 125 to 200."*
>
> *"The number of clients has almost doubled compared to last year at this time."*
>
> *"Prior to 9/11, our average monthly referrals were approximately 450. Post 9/11 we have seen a staggering increase to a monthly average in excess of 590 clients."*
>
> *"Immediately after 9/11 we had more of a demand but that leveled off."*
>
> *"We have seen a great change in the number of people we served after September 11, where as before we served about 500 persons, now we are serving more than 800 a month."*
>
> *"Considering the increasing number of pickups at our food pantry, and also of the disaster of 9/11, it is clear that our community needs our services even more."*
>
> *"The numbers of person using the pantry for food has increased rapidly and it will continue to increase. I've noticed that on a weekly basis we serve over 50 more clients."*
>
> *"After September 11th, the number of clients increased by 20%."*

Bronx Emergency Food Programs

Figure 9
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Bronx Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=25)



Duration of Demand at Bronx Soup Kitchens

- As shown in Figure 9 above, over two-thirds (68%) of the 25 responding Bronx soup kitchens reported a medium or high increased demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. The percentage of Bronx soup kitchens reporting a medium or high increased demand dropped slightly below 60% one month after September 11 and has stayed at this level eight months after September 11.

Figure 10
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Bronx Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=84)



Duration of Demand at Bronx Food Pantries

- As seen in Figure 10, 69% of the 84 food pantries in the Bronx reported a medium or high increased demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. The percentage of Bronx food pantries indicating a high level of

increased demand rose from 32.1% immediately after September 11 to 56% eight months after September 11.

Brooklyn Emergency Food Programs

Figure 11
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Brooklyn Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=55)



Duration of Demand at Brooklyn Soup Kitchens

- As shown in Figure 11 above, of the 55 Brooklyn soup kitchens, 69.1% reported an increased demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. The percentage of Brooklyn soup kitchens reporting an increased demand rose consistently after September 11, reaching a high of 76.3% eight months after September 11.

Figure 12
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Brooklyn Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=131)



Duration of Demand at Brooklyn Food Pantries

- As presented in Figure 12 above, 72.5% of the 131 Brooklyn food pantries reported an increase in demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. This percentage has remained fairly constant in the eight months after September 11, peaking at 76.3% one month after September 11.

Manhattan Emergency Food Programs

Figure 13
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Manhattan Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=37)



● As presented in Figure 13 above, of the 37 Manhattan soup kitchens with valid responses, 72.9% reported a medium or high increased demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. This percentage increased slightly to 75.6% one month later, remaining at this level eight months after September 11.

Figure 14
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Manhattan Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=80)



● As seen in Figure 14 above, 61.3% of the 80 Manhattan food pantries reported a medium or high increase in demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. This percentage has steadily increased since September 11, reaching a high of 80.1% eight months after September 11. These results indicate

that Manhattan food pantries have experienced a consistently increasing demand for emergency food assistance in the eight months since September 11.

Queens Emergency Food Programs

Figure 15
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Queens Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=13)



- As presented in Figure 15 above, of the 13 Queens soup kitchens, 46.2% indicated a medium or high increased demand for emergency food assistance immediately after September 11. While this percentage remained the same in the eight month time period after September 11, the percent of Queens soup kitchens characterizing the intensity of this increased demand as "high" rose from 15.4% immediately after September 11 to 30.8% four months later.

Figure 16
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Queens Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=64)



- As seen in Figure 16 above, 62.5% of the 64 Queens food pantries reported a medium or high increase in demand for emergency food assistance immediately

after September 11. The percentage of Queens pantries indicating an increased demand was at its highest eight months after September (76.6%), suggesting the impact of September 11 may have had a long-term effect on the demand for emergency food assistance at many Queens food pantries.

Staten Island Emergency Food Programs

Figure 17
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Staten Island Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=6)



- As shown in Figure 17 above, 4 of the 6 (66.7%) Staten Island soup kitchens reported that a medium or high increased demand for emergency food assistance occurred immediately after September 11. This increased demand immediately after September 11 appears to have been at a high level of intensity for three (50%) of the pantries.

Figure 18
Duration and Intensity of Increased Demand for Food Assistance at Staten Island Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=12)



- As presented in Figure 18 above, the demand for emergency food assistance at Staten Island food pantries rose over the eight months following September 11. Immediately after September 11, seven of the 12 Staten Island pantries (58.3%) reported a medium or high increased demand while eight months later 10 of the 12 pantries (83.3%) reported a medium or high level of increased demand.

Section 5. Factors Impacting the Demand for Emergency Food Assistance at New York City Soup Kitchens After September 11.

A number of factors impacted the demand for emergency food assistance at New York City EFPs well before the events of September 11. This section explores the continuing role of unemployment, homelessness, reduced public assistance, and insufficient wages in the increased demand for emergency food assistance at New York City EFPs after September 11. Each bar chart presents the percentage of EFPs that indicated a factor contributed to increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11. Results are presented by program type and citywide.

Citywide Soup Kitchens

Figure 19
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Citywide Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=136)



- As shown in Figure 19 above, 119 (87.5%) of the soup kitchens citywide that saw an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that unemployment was a contributing factor to this increased demand at their soup kitchen, the most frequently sited factor impacting demand for emergency food assistance. Soup kitchen operators described how unemployment has impacted their clients:

  "The demand for emergency food assistance seems to be much greater because more people are out of work."

  "More families use our program because one or both adults are without jobs or had to take a job for less pay. They have to use the soup kitchen as a substitute and make up for not having enough money."

"Due to the loss of jobs and the increase of the loss of homes there is a definite increase of clients looking for meals."

- Of the 136 soup kitchens citywide reporting an increase in demand for emergency food assistance post 9/11, 99 (72.8%) stated that homelessness played a role in increasing demand at their programs, the second most frequently cited factor in increased demand. A soup kitchen director stated:

"I find feeding the homeless clients has increased… I am giving out more clothing and emergency food."

- Six out of 10 (60.3%) soup kitchens that indicated increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 reported that insufficient wages contributed to this increased demand.

- Over half of soup kitchens with increased demands after September 11 indicated that a reduction in public assistance (55.9%) or loss of public assistance (55.1%) contributed to the increased demand for emergency food assistance at their soup kitchen. A soup kitchen operator stated:

"I think the main problem is job related but the reduction of welfare and food stamp benefits play other roles."

<u>*Bronx Soup Kitchens*</u>

Figure 20
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Bronx Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=25)



- As seen in Figure 20 above, 23 (92%) of the Bronx soup kitchens that reported an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 believed unemployment was a causative factor, making it the most commonly cited factor for Bronx soup kitchens.

- Nearly three out of four (72%) Bronx soup kitchens that experienced an increased demand for emergency food assistance post September 11 stated that inadequate

earnings helped increase demand for emergency food assistance at their program, the second most frequently cited factor at Bronx soup kitchens.

- Slightly over two-thirds (68%) of the 25 Bronx soup kitchens reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 thought homelessness played a role in this increase.

- Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Bronx soup kitchens with post 9/11 increases in demand for emergency food assistance indicated that a reduction and loss of public assistance were contributory factors in this increase.

- Over half of Bronx soup kitchens with an increased demand for emergency food assistance believed that a reduction or loss of food stamp benefits served to increase this demand after September 11 (52% and 56%, respectively).

Brooklyn Soup Kitchens

Figure 21
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Brooklyn Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=55)



- As presented in Figure 21 above, 49 (89.1%) of the Brooklyn soup kitchens with an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that unemployment contributed to this increase. Unemployment was the most frequently provided factor in the increased demand for emergency food assistance at Brooklyn soup kitchens after September 11.

- Homelessness was cited as contributing to the post 9/11 increase in demand for emergency food assistance by 76.4% of Brooklyn soup kitchens making it the second most cited factor at soup kitchens in that borough.

- Insufficient wages and a loss of public assistance were both cited by approximately six out of 10 Brooklyn soup kitchens as a causative factor in the increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 (63.6% and 61.8%, respectively).

- Over half (54.5%) of Brooklyn soup kitchens experiencing an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that a reduction in public assistance helped to increase demand at their soup kitchen.

- Slightly less than half (47.3%) of Brooklyn soup kitchens stated that the loss or reduction of food stamps served to increase demand for emergency food assistance at their program after September 11.

Manhattan Soup Kitchens

Figure 22
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Manhattan Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=37)



- As shown in Figure 22 above, unemployment was the most frequently mentioned factor in the increased demand for emergency food assistance at Manhattan soup kitchens (81.1%) after September 11, followed closely by homelessness (78.4%).

- Slightly over half of Manhattan soup kitchens with increased emergency food assistance demand after September 11 stated that a reduction in public assistance and insufficient wages helped increase demand for emergency food assistance at their program after September 11 (59.5% and 51.4%, respectively).

Queens Soup Kitchens



- As seen in Figure 23 above, 12 (92.3%) of the 13 Queens soup kitchens reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance post September 11 stated that unemployment was a contributing factor, making this the most frequently mentioned factor at Queens soup kitchens.

- Insufficient wages was cited by eight (61.5%) of the 13 Queens soup kitchens as a causative factor in the increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11.

- Slightly over half (53.8%) of Queens soup kitchens that experienced an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 reported homelessness as a factor in this increase.

Staten Island Soup Kitchens

Figure 24
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Staten Island Soup Kitchens after September 11, 2001 (n=6)



- As presented in Figure 24 above, all but one of the six (83.3%) Staten Island soup kitchens reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 stated that unemployment was a contributing factor, the most commonly cited reason at Staten Island soup kitchens.

- Four of the six (66.7%) Staten Island soup kitchens that experienced an increase in demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 believed homelessness played a key role in this increase at their program.

- Three of the six (50%) Staten Island soup kitchens that reported increased demand following September 11 mentioned the reduction in public assistance as a contributory factor.

Section 6. Factors Impacting the Demand for Emergency food assistance at New York City Food Pantries After September 11

Citywide Food Pantries

Figure 25
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Citywide Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=371)



- As presented in Figure 25 above, 327 (88.1%) of the citywide food pantries indicated that unemployment was a causative factor in the increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11, making unemployment the most commonly mentioned factor at New York City food pantries. Quotes from several food pantry operators illustrate how unemployment has impacted many EFPS after September 11:

  "We have more people that lost their job and have families with no income that come to our food pantry."

  "We had an increase in individuals who lost their jobs as the result of the events on September 11."

  "The long term effects will continue because of the lack of employment. A great deal of jobs were lost and people are finding it very difficult to make ends meet."

  "More working poor families and unemployed are using the food pantry as a supplement food source."

- Nearly three-fourths (73%) of food pantries citywide with increased demand indicated that inadequate wages exacerbated this increase after September 11.

- Over half of food pantries citywide reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that a reduction or loss of public assistance helped to increase demand (55.8% and 56.9%, respectively).

- A little over half (51.8%) of food pantries citywide reported that a reduction in food stamps benefits contributed to the increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11. One food pantry operator stated:

  "Our users are using the service more frequently than before 9-11 because of cuts in food stamps or discontinued food stamps.

Bronx Food Pantries

Figure 26
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Bronx Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=84)



- As seen in Figure 26 above, 77 (91.7%) of the Bronx food pantries that reported an increased demand after September 11 believed that unemployment was a contributing factor.

- Nearly three-fourths (72.6%) of Bronx food pantries that experienced an increase in demand after September 11 mentioned that insufficient wages played a role in this increase.

- Of the Bronx food pantries with an increased demand after September 11, 59.5% stated that the loss of public assistance helped to increase demand, and 58.3% indicated that a reduction in public assistance helped increase demand.

- Over half of Bronx soup kitchens stated that food stamp reduction or elimination contributed to the increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 (58.3% and 52.4%, respectively).

Brooklyn Food Pantries

Figure 27
Factors Contributing to Increase in Demand for Food Assistance at Brooklyn Food Pantries after September 11, 2001 (n=131)



- As shown in Figure 27 above, 116 (88.5%) of the food pantries in Brooklyn that experienced an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 believed that unemployment helped cause this increase at their food pantry.

- Slightly less than three-fourths (73.3%) of Brooklyn food pantries with increased demand attributed it partly to inadequate wages.

- Nearly 60% of Brooklyn food pantries with an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 stated that a loss or reduction in public assistance helped to increase demand at their program (56.5% and 58%, respectively).

- Approximately half (51.9%) of Brooklyn soup kitchens thought that a reduction in food stamps benefits contributed to the post September 11 increased demand for emergency food assistance at their program.

Manhattan Food Pantries



- As seen in Figure 28 above, 81.3% of Manhattan food pantries that reported an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 believed unemployment was a causative factor at their food pantry, the most frequently mentioned.

- Slightly over 70% of Manhattan food pantries with a rise in demand after September 11 stated that insufficient earnings intensified this increase at their program.

- Approximately six out of ten Manhattan food pantries with an increased demand after September 11 indicated a loss or reduction in public assistance helped create this increase (60% and 57.5%, respectively).

- Half of Manhattan soup kitchens with post September 11 increased demand reported that a decrease in food stamp benefits played a role in the increased demand for emergency food assistance.

Queens Food Pantries



- As presented in Figure 29 above, 58 (90.6%) of the 64 Queens food pantries with a post September 11 increased demand for emergency food assistance believed unemployment was a causative factor at their program.

- Three-fourths (75%) of Queens food pantries with an increased demand after September 11thought inadequate wages exacerbated this increase in the client population they serve.

- Half of Queens food pantries that experienced an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that a loss of public assistance helped to increase this need for their client population.

Staten Island Food Pantries



- As shown in Figure 30 above, 11 (91.7%) of the 12 Staten Island food pantries that experienced an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 stated unemployment was a contributing factor, making it the most often mentioned factor.

- The insufficient wages of their clients was mentioned by nine of the 12 (75%) Staten Island food pantries as a contributory factor in the higher demand for food after September 11.

- A loss of food stamps benefits was reported as a contributory factor by eight of the 12 (66.7%) Staten Island food pantries with seven out of 12 (58.3%) indicating that a reduction in food stamps played a role in the increased demand.

- Seven of the 12 (58.3%) Staten Island food pantries reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11 indicated that a loss of public assistance helped to increase demand within their client population, and half indicated that a reduction in public assistance helped to increase demand.

Section 7. Prevalence of Turning Someone Away for Emergency food Assistance at New York City Emergency Food Programs After September 11

This section presents two bar charts: the first contains the percentage of EFPs that indicated they were more likely to turn away someone seeking emergency food assistance post September 11, and the second contains all reasons for turning away clients after September 11.

Turning away a client seeking emergency food assistance implies that, in many instances, clients did not have access to one of their last resources for obtaining food and as a result may have experienced a high level of food insecurity.

Citywide Emergency Food Programs

Figure 31
Percent of Citywide Emergency Food Programs stating they were more likely to turn someone away for Food Assistance after September 11



- As seen in Figure 31 above, 14.5% of soup kitchens and 19.7% of food pantries citywide indicated that they were more likely to turn someone away for emergency food assistance after September 11 than before September 11. A soup kitchen operator described the situation at her program:

  "It is heartless and ungodly to turn a hungry person away, yet we are forced to, and we have no choice but to do just that. Our food and resources are at our limits."

Food pantries also described having to turn away clients seeking emergency food assistance due to an increased demand:

> *"Since September 11th 2001, our clients have increased and we were unable to feed all. We do our best with assistance."*
>
> *"To date, the church has provided enough additional funding to purchase extra food to keep up with the increased demand. We are not sure that this funding will always be available, and may have to turn people away or reduce the number of days we are open in the future, we hope not though."*

Figure 32
All Reasons for Turning Away Clients at Citywide EFPs Indicating They Were More Likely To Turn Away After September 11



- As seen in Figure 32 above, of the soup kitchens and food pantries that were more likely to turn away clients seeking emergency food assistance after September 11, 61.9% of soup kitchens and 83.1% of food pantries did so due to a lack of food.

- A lack of operating funds was cited as a cause by 42.9% of soup kitchens and 4.5% of food pantries indicating they more likely to turn clients away after September 11.

- A lack of staff was mentioned as a cause of having to turn away clients seeking emergency food assistance by 4.8% of soup kitchens and 15.5% of food pantries with increased probability of turning away after September 11.

- Insufficient physical space was mentioned as a factor by 9.5% of soup kitchens and 11.3% of food pantries more likely to turn away someone seeking emergency food assistance after September 11.

Section 8. Changes in New York City Soup Kitchen Operations After September 11

This section presents analysis results regarding the immediate and long-term impact of September 11 on the daily operations of EFPs. Analysis results are presented in two bar charts by each program type and borough. The first bar chart contains the percentage of EFPs indicating changes in various operational procedures immediately after September 11. The second bar chart presents an analysis of the length of selected operation changes since September 11.

Citywide Soup Kitchens

Figure 33
Percent of Citywide Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (N=187)



Figure 34
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at CitywideSoup Kitchens



- As seen in Figures 33 and 34 above, 51 (27.3%) of soup kitchens citywide reported increasing their program's hours immediately after September 11. Of these 51

soup kitchens, 21 (41.1%) stated that increased hours were in place for less than two months after September 11, 11 (21.6%) reported that they increased the hours open at their soup kitchen for between two to five months after September 11 and 19 (37.3%) said that increased hours of operation were still being used five to eight months after September 11. Soup kitchen operators stated:

> *"We have had to change the [ending] time for lunch to 1:30pm. The clients do express their appreciation and what it means to know that they will have access."*
>
> *"We think we can reach more people and help more if we increase our hours."*

- Seventy-eight (41.7%) of citywide soup kitchens indicated they increased the amount of food provided to clients immediately after September 11. Of these 78 soup kitchens, 22 (28.2%) stated that this change was in effect for less than two months after September 11, 10 (12.8%) reported this change lasted between two to five months after September 11, and 46 (59%) of soup kitchens reported that they were still increasing food amounts to clients five to eight months after September 11. A soup kitchen director stated:

> *"We had to increase amounts of food. More stand-bys attend, had largest demand in November and December."*

Bronx Soup Kitchens

Figure 35
Percent of Bronx Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=36)



Figure 36
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Bronx Soup Kitchens



- As seen in Figures 35 and 36 above, 13 (36.1%) Bronx soup kitchens stated they increased their operating hours immediately after September 11. Of these 13 Bronx soup kitchens, six (46.1%) reported that operating hours were increased for less than two months after September 11, five (38.5%) indicated that increased hours were still being used between two to five months after September 11, and two (15.4%) stated that increased hours were in effect for five to eight months after September 11.

- As shown above, 16 (44.4%) of the 36 Bronx soup kitchens indicated increasing the amount of food provided to soup kitchen users after September 11. Of the 16 Bronx soup kitchens that increased the quantity of provided food, six (37.4%) said this operating change was used for less than two months after September 11, one (6.3%) indicated this change lasted between two to five months after September 11, and nine (56.3%) reported increasing the amount of food provided to clients five to eight months after September 11.

Brooklyn Soup Kitchens

Figure 37
Percent of Brooklyn Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=66)



Figure 38
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Brooklyn Soup Kitchens



- As shown in Figures 37 and 38 above, 19 (28.8%) Brooklyn soup kitchens indicated extending their operation hours immediately after September 11. Of these 19 soup kitchens, seven (36.8%) reported that increased hours were used for less than two months after September 11, six (31.6%) stated increased hours were in place between two to five months after September 11 and six (31.6%) reported using increased operating hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Thirty-four (51.5%) Brooklyn soup kitchens stated increasing the food amount for program clients immediately after September 11. Of these 34 Brooklyn soup kitchens, eight (23.5%) said they increased food amounts for clients for less than two months after September 11, five (14.7%) reported this change lasted between two to five months after September 11, and 21 (61.8%) of Brooklyn soup kitchens increasing food amounts to clients indicated continuing to do so five to eight months after September 11.

Manhattan Soup Kitchens

Figure 39
Percent of Manhattan Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=52)



Figure 40
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Manhattan Soup Kitchens



- As presented in Figures 39 and 40 above, ten (19.2%) Manhattan soup kitchens reported increasing their hours of operation immediately after September 11. Of these ten soup kitchens, four (40%) increased hours up until two months after September 11, and six (60%) reported increasing operating hours for five or more months after September 11.

- Fifteen (28.8%) Manhattan soup kitchens stated they increased the amount of food provided to program users immediately after September 11. Of these 15 Manhattan soup kitchens, four (26.7%) stated that this change was in effect for less than two months after September 11, three (20%) indicated this operating change lasted between two to five months after September 11, and eight Manhattan soup kitchens (53.3%) reported that they increased the quantity of food provided to clients for five to eight months after September 11.

Queens Soup Kitchens

Figure 41
Percent of Queens Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=23)



Figure 42
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Queens Soup Kitchens



- As seen in Figures 41 and 42 above, six (26.1%) of the 23 Queens soup kitchens increased their program's hours immediately after September 11. Of these six Queens soup kitchens, half increased hours for less than two months after September 11 and half still operated under increased hours for five to eight months after September 11.

- Nine (39.1%) of 23 Queens soup kitchens increased the amount of food provided to clients immediately after September 11. Of these nine Queens soup kitchens, three (33.3%) said this operations change lasted for less than two months after September 11, one program (11.1%) increased food amounts two to five months after September 11, and five (55.6%) Queens soup kitchens stated they were still increasing food amounts five to eight months after September 11.

Staten Island Soup Kitchens

Figure 43
Percent of Staten Island Soup Kitchens Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=10)



Figure 44
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Staten Island Soup Kitchens



- As shown in Figures 43 and 44 above, three (30%) of the ten Staten Island soup kitchens reported increasing their program hours immediately after September 11. Of these three Staten Island soup kitchens, one program (36.3%) stated that the policy of increased hours lasted for less than two months after September 11 and two (66.7%) reported that increased hours of operation were still being used five to eight months after September 11.

- Four (40%) of the ten Staten Island soup kitchens indicated they increased the quantity of food provided to clients immediately after September 11. Of these four Staten Island soup kitchens, one (25%) said this operations change was in effect for less than two months after September 11 and three stated (75%) that they were still providing increased amounts of food five to eight months after September 11.

Section 9. Changes in New York City Food Pantry Operations After September 11

Citywide Food Pantries

Figure 45
Percent of Citywide Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (N=456)



Figure 46
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Citywide Food Pantries



- As seen in Figures 45 and 46 above, 174 (38.2%) food pantries citywide reported they increased operating hours immediately after September 11. Of these 174 food pantries, 72 (41.4%) indicated this change was still in effect five to eight months after September 11. Food pantry operators described changes in operating hours after September 11, 2001:

  "There are people coming to our food pantry that never came to our pantry before and we are now open longer hours."

  "Instead of opening from 1PM-4PM we are now open from 9AM-4PM."

  "We have two shifts in order to accommodate the increase of the number of clients."

- Eighty (17.5%) of the food pantries citywide reported that immediately after September 11, they increased the number of days they were open. Of these 80 food pantries, 47 (58.7%) said they were still operating with increased days five to eight months after September 11. Food pantry operators elaborated about increasing the number of operating days after September 11:

  "More new people are coming to pick a bag of food. Because of this, I now open 2 days and sometimes 3 days depending on how much food I received."

  "We are now forced to give food out every day, instead of once a week."

  "We normally open 5 days a week from Monday to Friday, but due to the increase of people, we are now open on Saturday also."

- Of citywide food pantries, 245 (53.7%) indicated increasing the quantity of provided food immediately after September 11. Of these 245 food pantries, 126 (51.4%) reported continuing to increase food portions five to eight months after September 11. A pantry operator stated:

  "Our population remains unchanged. However, our clients are asking for more food as a result of lack of other resources."

- Sixty-nine (15.1%) of food pantries citywide stated that they were forced to decrease the quantity of food provided to clients after September 11. Of these 69 food pantries, 37 (53.6%) reported they continued to provide decreased amounts of food to clients five to eight months after September 11. Food pantry operators stated:

  "We had to make the pantry bags smaller in order to accommodate more users."

  "I have to give each person a little less in each bag, to make the food last longer."

Bronx Food Pantries

Figure 47
Percent of Bronx Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=104)



Figure 48
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Bronx Food Pantries



- As seen in Figures 47 and 48 above, 47 (45.2%) Bronx food pantries stated that immediately after September 11, they increased their operating hours. Of these 47 Bronx food pantries, 19 (40.4%) were still operating under extended hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Twenty-two (21.2%) Bronx food pantries reported they increased the number of days they were open after September 11. Of these 22 Bronx food pantries, 16 (72.8%) were still operating with increased days five to eight months after September 11.

- Fifty-nine (56.7%) Bronx food pantries indicated increasing the amount of provided food immediately after September 11. Nearly half (47.5%) of these 59 Bronx food pantries continued to increase the quantity of food provided to clients five to eight months after September 11.

- Eighteen (17.3%) Bronx food pantries stated they decreased the quantity of food they provided to clients after September 11. Of these 18 food pantries, seven (38.9%) reported that they were still providing decreased amounts of food to clients five to eight months after September 11.

Brooklyn Food Pantries

Figure 49
Percent of Brooklyn Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=159)



Figure 50
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Brooklyn Food Pantries



- As shown in Figures 49 and 50 above, 64 (40.3%) Brooklyn food pantries stated they extended program hours right after September 11. Of these 64 Brooklyn food pantries, 28 (43.8%) reported continuing to operate with increased hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Twenty-eight (17.6%) Brooklyn food pantries indicated increasing the number of days they were open immediately after September 11. Of these 28 food pantries, 16 (57.1%) reported they were operating with increased days five to eight months after September 11.

- Ninety-six (60.4%) Brooklyn food pantries reported that after September 11, they increased the quantity of food given to clients. Half of these 96 Brooklyn food

pantries were continuing to provide increased amounts five to eight months after September 11.

- Twenty-three (14.5%) Brooklyn food pantries reported having to decrease the quantity of food provided to each client after September 11. Of these 23 food pantries, 15 (65.2%) continued to decrease food amounts to clients five to eight months after September 11.

Manhattan Food Pantries

Figure 51
Percent of Manhattan Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=98)



Figure 52
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Manhattan Food Pantries



- As seen in Figures 51 and 52 above, 27 (27.6%) Manhattan food pantries increased operating hours immediately after September 11. Eleven (40.7%) of these 27 Manhattan food pantries kept these extended operating hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Thirteen (13.3%) Manhattan food pantries reported increasing the number of days they were open immediately after September 11. Of these 13 Manhattan food pantries, six (46.2%) said they were operating with increased days at least five to eight months after September 11.

- Immediately after September 11, 40 (40.8%) Manhattan food pantries increased the quantity of food they provided to clients. Over half (55%) of these 40 food pantries stated they were continuing to increase food amounts five to eight months after September 11.

- After September 11, 12 (12.2%) Manhattan food pantries reduced the amount of food they gave to clients. Of these 12 food pantries, half were still decreasing amounts of food five to eight months after September 11.

Queens Food Pantries

Figure 53
Percent of Queens Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=78)



Figure 54
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Queens Food Pantries



- As shown in Figures 53 and 54 above, 31 (39.7%) Queens food pantries extended their hours of operation after September 11. Of these 31 Queens food pantries, 15 (48.4%) operated with extended hours for less than two months after September 11 and 11 (35.5%) continued to operate with increased hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Fifteen (19.2%) Queens food pantries increased the number of days they were open immediately after September 11. Over half (53.3%) of these 15 Queens food

pantries were operating with increased days five to eight months after September 11.

- Forty-three (55.1%) Queens food pantries reported increasing the quantity of food provided to their program users after September 11. Of these 43 Queens food pantries, over half (55.8%) were still providing increased amounts of food five to eight months after September 11.

- Eleven (14.1%) Queens food pantries decreased the amount of food they provided to clients after September 11. Of these 11 Queens food pantries, six (54.4%) continued to provide decrease quantities of food to clients five to eight months after September 11.

Staten Island Food Pantries

Figure 55
Percent of Staten Island Food Pantries Indicating Changes in Operations after September 11, 2001 (n=17)



Figure 56
Length of Selected Operations Changes Occuring Immediately after September 11, 2001 at Staten Island Food Pantries



- As seen in Figures 55 and 56 above, immediately after September 11, five (29.4%) of the 17 Staten Island food pantries increased their operating hours. Of these five

Staten Island food pantries, three (60%) indicated they were still operating with extended hours five to eight months after September 11.

- Two (11.8%) of the 17 surveyed Staten Island food pantries stated they increased the number of days they operated immediately after September 11. Of these two food pantries, one program continued to increased operating days between two and five months after September 11 and the other program stated they were operating with increased days five to eight months after September 11.

- Of the 17 Staten Island food pantries, seven (41.2%) reported that immediately after September 11, they increased the amount of food they provided to clients. Of these seven food pantries, four (57.1%) stated that five to eight months after September 11 they were still providing increased food quantities.

- After September 11, five (29.4%) of the 17 surveyed Staten Island food pantries stated that they were forced to decrease the amount of food they provided to clients. Of these five food pantries, three (60%) decreased amounts of food for five to eight months after September 11.

Section 10. New York City Soup Kitchen Needs After September 11

EFPs were asked to rank order eight program needs, with "8" being the highest need and "1" being the lowest need. While EFPs were instructed to use each number only once, nearly half of all responding agencies did not correctly rank order all eight needs. This section presents analysis results for those agencies correctly rank ordering EFP needs. Mean rank orders are presented in bar charts for each program type and borough. The higher the mean rank, the higher the reported need.

Citywide Soup Kitchens

Figure 57
Rank Order of Citywide Soup Kitchen Needs (n=101)



- As shown in Figure 57 above, soup kitchens citywide indicated that increased operating funds was the greatest need of their programs after September 11 (mean=6.68), followed closely by food (mean=6.18). Soup kitchen operators stated:

  "The demand is increasing to be open to serve meals with limited and sometimes no financial support to help run our program. Thank you for the food but we really need funds too."

  "We are thinking about increasing the number of days we are open because of the need in our community. The only reason we haven't is we just don't have the food and money needed for an additional day."

- To a lesser extent, New York City soup kitchens reported that their greatest need was more paid staff (mean=4.73) and volunteers (mean=4.32). Several soup kitchen operators elaborated:

"The impact of 9/11 on our program is a need for more staff to help meet the demand of labor required."

"The long term effect of September 11 will be the need for more paid staffing to handle the larger operation in servicing the clients."

Bronx Soup Kitchens

Figure 58
Rank Order of Bronx Soup Kitchen Needs (n=15)



- As presented in Figure 58 above, the greatest need of Bronx soup kitchens appears to be operating funds (mean=5.66) and food (mean=5.46).

- Soup kitchens in the Bronx ranked the need for physical space as fairly high (mean=5.06). Paid staff does not appear to be as great a need at Bronx soup kitchens as volunteers (mean=3.66 and 5.06, respectively).

- Nutrition education was ranked as a fairly high need by Bronx soup kitchens (mean=4.46) pointing to the possible desire for workshops, materials, and training.

Brooklyn Soup Kitchens

Figure 59
Rank Order of Brooklyn Soup Kitchen Needs (n=39)



- As seen in Figure 59 above, Brooklyn soup kitchens reported a very high need for operating funds (mean=6.97) and food (mean=6.56).

- Brooklyn soup kitchens ranked paid staff as a fairly high need (mean=5.20).

Manhattan Soup Kitchens

Figure 60
Rank Order of Manhattan Soup Kitchen Needs (n=33)



- As presented in Figure 60 above, the greatest reported need of Manhattan soup kitchens was financial resources (mean=6.84) followed closely by food (mean=6.63).

- To a lesser extent, Manhattan soup kitchens indicated a high need for paid staff (mean=4.66) and space (mean=4.06).

Queens Soup Kitchens

Figure 61
Rank Order of Queens Soup Kitchen Needs (n=9)



- As shown in Figure 61 above, although the greatest need of Queens soup appears to be operating funds (mean=6.33), there is also a noticeable need for food and volunteers (mean=4.77 and 4.88, respectively).

- Queens soup kitchens also reported somewhat of a need for computers, physical space and nutrition education (mean=4.33, 4.33 and 4.27, respectively).

Staten Island Soup Kitchens

Figure 62
Rank Order of Staten Island Soup Kitchen Needs (n=5)



- As seen in Figure 62 above, the greatest needs of the five responding Staten Island soup kitchens were operating funds (mean=7.00) and paid staff (mean=6.20).

- To a lesser extent, Staten Island soup kitchens indicated a need for volunteers and food (mean=5.00), and technical assistance (mean=4.40)

Section 11. New York City Food Pantry Needs After September 11

Citywide Food Pantries

Figure 63
Rank Order of Citywide Food Pantry Needs (n=275)



- As shown in Figure 63 above, food pantries in New York City ranked food as their highest need (mean=6.39) followed closely by operating funds (mean=6.36). Several food pantry operators described the need for increased amounts of food and funding after September 11:

  "We need more food so that we can pack a decent bag for our clients."
  "The most significant change at our pantry is the increased need for emergency food assistance. We need more food! The people keep coming."

  "Since 9/11 there has been an upsurge in the need for emergency food assistance. This drastic increase has placed more pressure upon the food pantry, supplies are being depleted twice the normal rate. We are in dire need of more funding and/or food."

  "The demand to be open is increasing to serve pantry bags. With limited and sometimes no financial support to help maintain our program with the supplies and help that is needed."

  "The number one problem is that we have had no funding given to our agency since we have opened."

  "Our dream is to serve more of the community. The only thing that holds us back is the lack of funding."

- New York City food pantries also indicated that more paid staff, volunteers and physical space were needed at their programs (mean=4.38, 4.37 and 4.33, respectively). Several food pantry operators elaborated on the need for increased staff and space:

"We need additional paid staff. We used to be able to serve more days a week according to the needs of the population."

"We are considering increasing the number of days so that those people who cannot come on Wednesday for food can do so. However, the problem we have now, and definitely will have considering the increased hours, is volunteers who are available to staff an additional time slot."

"We have continued the same rate of distribution. But lack of space does not allow us to stock too much at one time."

"As for our food pantry, we are getting a new location so that we will be able to obtain more food and increase our days."

"Until we acquire the new location for storage, we cannot do anything, but we have this as our priority."

Bronx Food Pantries

Figure 64
Rank Order of Bronx Food Pantry Needs (n=59)



- As presented in Figure 64 above, Bronx food pantries reported a high need for food (mean=6.42) and operating funds (mean=6.22).

- Food pantries in the Bronx also ranked physical space and volunteers as fairly high needs at their programs (mean=4.37).

Brooklyn Food Pantries

Figure 65
Rank Order of Brooklyn Food Pantry Needs (n=91)



- As seen in Figure 65 above, Brooklyn food pantries indicated a high need for funds (mean=6.43) and food (mean=6.36).

- Brooklyn food pantries also reported a fairly high need for paid staff (mean=4.72) volunteers (mean=4.36) and space (mean=4.12).

Manhattan Food Pantries

Figure 66
Rank Order of Manhattan Food Pantry Needs (n=67)



- As seen in Figure 66 above, Manhattan food pantries ranked food as their highest need (mean=6.43) followed by operating funds (mean=6.34).

- Physical space was ranked as the third highest need by Manhattan food pantries (mean=4.53) followed by paid staff (mean=4.38) and volunteers (mean=4.10).

Queens Food Pantries

Figure 67
Rank Order of Queens Food Pantry Needs (n=48)



- As presented in Figure 67 above, food pantries in Queens indicated that operating funds was the highest need of their programs (mean=6.35) followed by food (mean=6.29).

- Queens food pantries also ranked volunteers and space as moderately high needs (mean=4.79 and 4.43, respectively).

Staten Island Food Pantries

Figure 68
Rank Order of Staten Island Food Pantry Needs (n=10)



- As seen in Figure 68 above, Staten Island food pantries ranked operating funds as their highest need (mean=6.80). Food was also ranked as a high need (mean=6.70).

- Increased number of paid staff was seen as a need by Staten Island food pantries (mean=5.10) and to a lesser extent, volunteers (mean=4.20) and program space (mean=4.10).

Conclusions

This survey of emergency feeding programs was undertaken in an attempt to identify changes in emergency food assistance after September 11, 2001. Survey analysis results revealed that 80% of soup kitchens and 84% of food pantries reported an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11. The intensity and duration of this increased demand at soup kitchens and food pantries was at its highest point five to eight months after September 11, pointing to the possible long-term impact of September 11 on demand for emergency food assistance in New York City.

A borough analysis of soup kitchen survey data showed that Brooklyn had the highest percentage of soup kitchens indicating an increased demand for emergency food assistance after September 11. The intensity of demand at soup kitchens was especially high in Manhattan and Brooklyn where approximately three-fourths of soup kitchens in each of those boroughs experienced a severe and enduring increased demand for food.

Analysis of food pantry survey data indicated that Queens had only a slightly higher percentage of programs reporting an increased demand for emergency food assistance than the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan. The long-term increased demand at food pantries was especially intense in Manhattan and Staten Island food pantries, with over 80% of pantries experiencing a sustained increase in demand for food that was still present five to eight months after September 11.

While the direct impact of September 11 on the demand for emergency food in New York City communities is difficult to isolate, several factors played a definite role in emergency food assistance demand after September 11. Soup kitchens reported

that unemployment had the greatest impact on demand for emergency food assistance after September 11, followed by homelessness and insufficient wages. Approximately half of soup kitchens reported that a reduction or loss of public assistance impacted the demand for emergency food assistance. The impact of unemployment and inadequate wages on the increased demand for food was especially felt at Bronx and Queens soup kitchens after September 11, while Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Staten Island soup kitchens cited homelessness and unemployment as the key contributing factors.

Food pantries reported that unemployment and insufficient wages were the two leading contributory factors in the increased demand for food after September 11. Borough analysis results show these two factors to be the most frequently cited at food pantries in all five boroughs.

The most urgent needs of soup kitchens after September 11 were operating funds and food, followed by paid staff and volunteers. In many cases, programs stated that increased funds and staffing would have allowed them to meet the increased demand for emergency food after September 11. Borough analysis of survey data showed that in addition to operating funds and food, Bronx soup kitchens were in need of space, volunteers, and nutrition education. Soup kitchens in Brooklyn and Manhattan reported a need for paid staff, operating funds and food. Queens soup kitchens had a high need for volunteers and operating funds but also indicated a need for food, space, computers and nutrition education. Staten Island soup kitchens indicated a high need for operating monies and paid staff, and to a lesser extent, a need for food, volunteers, and technical assistance.

Food pantries reported similar needs as soup kitchens (operating funds, food and staffing), but also indicated a need for physical space. Borough level analysis demonstrated that each borough ranked these items as their highest needs after September 11.

The ability of EFPs to meet community demand for emergency food assistance and lessen food insecurity for many New Yorkers may have been negatively impacted by the events of September 11. Immediately after September 11, 14.5% of soup kitchens and 19.7% of food pantries reported they were more apt to turn someone away for emergency food assistance than before September 11, primarily because of a lack of food and operating funds. While the majority of EFPs were not more likely to turn away clients after September 11, EFPs did experience long-term changes in program operations immediately after September 11. Soup kitchens increased hours of operation as well as the amount of food provided to each client. Conversely, the increased demand for food after September 11 prompted some food pantries to decrease the size of pantry bags. In addition to altering food quantities and operating hours, food pantries increased the number of days they provided pantry bags, one of many operation changes that has continued long after September 11, 2001.

Study Limitations

When interpreting findings from this research study certain cautions should be exercised. First, the data regarding the socio-demographic composition of food pantry clients does not represent all persons benefiting from pantry bags, but simply represents all persons picking up pantry bags. While identifying the socio-demographics of all persons in a household consuming food from pantry bags would be very useful, it would require an in-depth client level survey. Second, since survey respondents are asked to recall socio-demographic client information for time periods before and after September 11, 2001, for agencies that do not keep records of this client data, this information should be viewed as the best possible estimation available. Third, because completed surveys were received from agencies mid-May to mid-June 2002, the definition of "present time" varies depending on the time of survey completion. Since the date of each survey completion was not obtained, "present time" was defined as approximately eight months after September 11, 2001. Fourth, normal seasonal fluctuations in demand for emergency food assistance were not controlled for. Finally, we do not purport to make a causal relationship between the events of September 11, 2001 and increased demand for emergency food. A direct causative relationship would be extremely difficult to isolate given the fact that even before September 11, 2001, a slowing economy and high unemployment were causing many food insecure New Yorkers to turn to emergency feeding programs.

Glossary of Terms

Agency: A nonprofit, community-based organization that packages or cooks food provided by a food bank for people seeking emergency food assistance, who would otherwise not get enough to eat or not eat well. An agency may operate one or more food programs, such as a food pantry or a soup kitchen, and may provide additional, non-food services.

Emergency Food Program: A soup kitchen, food pantry or shelter serving people seeking food relief. The Food Bank For New York City provides food to our network of more than 1,000 emergency food programs citywide.

Food Bank: A nonprofit organization that solicits, collects, purchases, and stores food and related products from manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and government agencies and distributes it to community food programs. The Food Bank For New York City, Food For Survival is New York City's only food bank.

Food Bank For New York City: A food bank that distributes nonperishable foods, fresh produce and other perishable goods to its network of more than 1,000 community food programs. It is largest food bank in the country and the only food bank serving the five boroughs of New York City. In addition, the Food Bank 1.) offers nutrition and food safety education training to its network of food relief programs 2.) conducts awareness campaigns to educate the public about hunger issues and 3.) regularly conducts studies and surveys regarding hunger trends and issues in New York City.

Food Insecurity: The United States Department of Agriculture developed this term to describe a person who does not have assured access at all times to enough nutritious food to lead a healthy, active life.

Food Pantry: An emergency food program that provides families that have a place to live, but not enough food, with three-to-five day food packages for the preparation of nutritionally balanced meals. Food pantries are a key source of emergency food for the working poor and for people whose food stamp benefits run out before month's end.

Food Security: The United States Department of Agriculture developed this term to describe someone who has access at all times to enough food to lead an active, healthy life. Includes at minimum: 1.) the ready availability of nutritionally adequate and safe food and 2.) the assured ability to acquire nutritious and safe food in socially acceptable ways (e.g. without relying on emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing or other coping strategies).

Food Stamp Program: A federal program that provides monthly benefits to eligible low-income families for the purchase of food.

Hunger: The involuntary lack of access to food for an intermittent or extended period of time. Also, the uneasy or painful sensation caused by lack of food. Hunger can be

caused by external forces that limit someone's resources or ability to obtain sufficient food and may result in detrimental physical and psychological consequences.

Pantry: See "Food Pantry"

Prepared Foods: Food prepared for serving in a restaurant, cafeteria, etc.

Soup Kitchen: Serve walk-in families and individuals a hot, nutritious meal, often their only meal of the day. Many soup kitchens also offer meals to the homebound.

Food Bank For New York City Research and Policy Department

Lucy Cabrera, Ph.D., has been the President and CEO of the Food Bank For New York City since 1988. During her tenure, Dr. Cabrera has spearheaded several important research projects including *Who Feeds The Hungry? Mapping New York City's Emergency Food Providers (1995 and 2000 studies);* the first-of-it's kind *Directory of New York City Emergency Food Programs*; and two New York City hunger studies done in collaboration with America's Second Harvest, the national hunger relief organization: *Hunger 1997: The Faces & Facts,* and *Hunger in America 2001: The New York City Report*.

Dr. Cabrera received a Ph.D. from Columbia University, where she majored in social policy research and administration, and authored "Racial and Ethnic Influence on Job Satisfaction Levels in Subordinate-Superior Dyadic Relationships: Does Difference Make a Difference?" She holds a Masters degree in social policy from Columbia University and a second Masters degree in Management from New York's Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI). She has a Bachelor of Arts, Business Administration degree from Inter-American University of Puerto Rico. Dr. Cabrera is a Certified Association Executive.

Rodney Thomas is currently the Director of Research and Policy at the Food Bank For New York City. He has over 10 years of experience conducting social research at the community level. Mr. Thomas completed a bachelor's degree in social gerontology from Bowling Green State University and a master's degree in applied social research from West Virginia University.

Immediately after completing his master's degree, Mr. Thomas worked as a research associate in the Urban Child Research Center, a multidisciplinary research center at Cleveland State University that studies issues related to the growth and development of children in urban settings. At the center he was responsible for multiple community-based research projects related to youth violence prevention, health care availability, daycare need, and immunization rates.

Most recently, Mr. Thomas was a research associate at an educational research firm in Manhattan where he was responsible for multiple school-based program evaluations related to universal school breakfast and lunch, multilingual/multicultural education, literacy, teacher professional development, classroom technology, special education and comprehensive school reform.

Mr. Thomas' research skills include survey research, data analysis, program evaluation, and qualitative methods. Mr. Thomas is a member of the American Educational Research Association.

End Notes

[i] United States Conference of Mayors. (2001). A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities.

[ii] America's Second Harvest. (2001), Hunger in American 2001: The New York City Report.